The Winner Takes It All? CMA updates leniency policy

On 28 October 2025, the UK Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) published its updated guidance on 'Applications for leniency and no-action in cartel cases' (CMA210) (the Revised Guidance), which reflects changes to the CMA's leniency policy since 2013. 

What you need to know

• The CMA has updated its leniency programme to make applications for Type A immunity (applications for leniency before the CMA has started to investigate) more attractive relative to Type B and Type C leniency applications (applications for leniency after the CMA has started an investigation or already has sufficient information to establish the existence of cartel activity).
• Type B applicants can no longer receive complete immunity from financial penalties (which will be available only for Type A applicants). The CMA has also clarified that the maximum discounts from financial penalties for Type B and Type C applicants are unlikely to exceed 75% and 50% (respectively).
• Individuals employed by Type B and Type C applicants will now receive immunity from Competition Disqualification Orders (CDOs) only at the CMA's discretion, and will rarely receive immunity from criminal prosecution.
• The requirement for leniency applicants to admit to cartel conduct is now required only when the leniency agreement is signed (rather than at the beginning of the leniency process).
• The definition of cartel activity has been expanded to include further examples based on recent case law developments.

The CMA's leniency regime encourages businesses and individuals who have been involved in cartel activity to disclose their conduct to the CMA and to cooperate with any investigation undertaken by the CMA in exchange for immunity from, or a reduction in, financial penalties. Cooperating individuals may also receive immunity from criminal prosecution and/or protection from director disqualification proceedings. The CMA's leniency policy forms an integral part of its strategy for effective detection (by bringing to light otherwise secret cartel behaviour) and public enforcement against cartels in order to deter against anti-competitive conduct.

The leniency regime provides the first applicant that comes forward to report and provide evidence of cartel conduct (and agrees to cooperate with the CMA's investigation) with full immunity from financial penalties and exemption from exclusion and/or debarment from public procurement. In addition, individuals associated with that applicant are granted immunity from director disqualification and/or criminal prosecution. This is known as Type A immunity. Type A immunity is only available where the CMA does not have a pre-existing investigation into the alleged cartel activity and does not otherwise have sufficient information to establish the existence of the alleged cartel activity.

If the CMA has a pre-existing investigation into the alleged activity when the first applicant comes forward, or if subsequent leniency applicants come forward after the first applicant, the CMA offers Type B leniency and Type C leniency respectively. Type B and Type C leniency applicants may receive reductions in penalties for their cooperation in the investigation for any "added value" provided by the leniency applicant (additional discretionary protections, such as immunity from director disqualification, may also be available).

The Revised Guidance, which was consulted on in April 2025, reflects developments in the CMA's cartel enforcement policy and processes since 2013 and also incorporates recent changes to legislation. In addition, the Revised Guidance seeks to improve the "predictability" and "process" of the CMA's leniency programme in line with the CMA's 4Ps framework (Pace, Predictability, Proportionality and Process) and seeks to provide greater incentives for Type A immunity applicants (by making the benefits more attractive relative to the benefits available to Type B and Type C leniency applicants).

The Revised Guidance removes the availability of full immunity from financial penalties for Type B applicants and clarifies that discounts for Type B applicants are "unlikely" to exceed 75%. The Revised Guidance also specifies that the CMA would not generally expect to grant discounts of more than 50% to Type B applicants in resale price maintenance cases.

In respect of Type C applicants, the Revised Guidance states that discounts in the range of 25% to 50% can generally be expected. 

These changes largely reflect the CMA's recent decisional practice, where discounts for Type B leniency applicants have ranged between 20%-70% and discounts for Type C applicants have ranged between 15%-50%. However, the Revised Guidance also notes that discounts for Type B and Type C can be significantly lower (and potentially as low as 10%).

Finally, the Revised Guidance removes the availability of a "leniency plus" discount where a Type B or Type C applicant in one market reports "completely separate cartel activity" in another market and obtains a Type B marker in that second market. In other words, only applicants for Type A immunity in the second market may benefit from a leniency plus discount. The Revised Guidance also clarifies that leniency plus discounts are unlikely to be high and "generally unlikely to exceed 5%" other than in exceptional circumstances.

Under the Revised Guidance, immunity from Competition Disqualification Orders (CDOs) for directors of Type B and Type C applicants will be at the discretion of the CMA (in contrast with the previous guidance, under which CDO immunity was automatically awarded for full cooperation). Type A applicants will continue to receive automatic immunity from director disqualification. The CMA has stated that this change reflects its experience under the competition director disqualification regime, the public policy objectives of this regime, and its objective of "widening the gap between the protections available to Type A applicants and those available to Type B and Type C applicants". 

Since the first competition disqualification case, which was in 2016, the CMA has pursued CDOs or Competition Disqualification Undertakings (CDUs) in 9 separate cases, resulting in 28 CDUs and 1 CDO. Obtaining CDOs/CDUs are now considered as standard practice by the CMA in investigations launched under the Competition Act 1998.

The Revised Guidance notes that discretionary immunity decisions "will usually be taken later in the investigation", which could be as late as shortly before any Statement of Objections is issued. However, the Revised Guidance states that the CMA will aim to keep applicants informed as to when it considers it will be in a position to reach such a decision.

Criminal immunity

The Revised Guidance makes clear that Type B and C applicants will rarely receive immunity from criminal prosecution at the discretion of the CMA except in "exceptional circumstances, depending on the individual facts of the case". This reflects the CMA's view that the public interest considerations generally outweigh the potential value added by the prospective applicant to a cartel investigation.

The Revised Guidance updates the definition of cartel activity to reflect recent case law developments, including by expanding the non-exhaustive list of cartel activities for which leniency is "likely to be available". The current list has been expanded to include:

• agreements between competitors to fix or coordinate purchase prices (i.e. in addition to supply prices), including agreements to fix or coordinate wages or other trading conditions;

• anti-competitive information exchange or sharing of current and future pricing intentions (or other relevant parameters of competition), whether exchanged directly or indirectly via third parties or, in certain circumstances, public announcements;

• no-poach agreements;

• pay-for-delay agreements; and

• arrangements to restrict innovation aimed at meeting or exceeding sustainability goals or to achieve that goal more quickly. 

The CMA may also grant leniency for conduct that is not expressly defined as cartel activity. In cases where there is genuine uncertainty as to whether conduct constitutes cartel activity, the Revised Guidance advises prospective applicants to seek confidential guidance directly from the CMA. 

The CMA's previous leniency guidance stated that leniency applicants must have a "genuine intention to confess" at the point of making a leniency application. However, respondents to the CMA's consultation submitted that this requirement discouraged prospective leniency applicants because, at the time that a leniency application is submitted, the precise scope of the conduct may be still unclear. 

The CMA has updated its leniency guidance to state that applicants must admit to participating in cartel activity at the point of signing a leniency agreement (which typically takes place well into the CMA's investigation process and shortly before the CMA issues a Statement of Objections). However, leniency applicants will remain subject to a requirement not to act in a way that would be inconsistent with an admission of cartel activity and must commit to providing complete and continuous cooperation during the CMA's investigation.