Last week, on 30 October, the Grenfell Tower Inquiry published its report on Phase 1. Running to almost 1,000 pages, the report examines what happened on the night of 14 June 2017 and how a recently refurbished building was engulfed in flames with such catastrophic consequences. The terrible loss of life that night remains of paramount significance and the victims and bereaved are at the forefront of our minds as the Inquiry's findings are digested.
Sir Martin Moore-Bick has stated that he was able to reach clear conclusions in relation to what happened as a result of the evidence he heard over the course of Phase 1. He confirmed that the reason for the fire's severity was the use of combustible aluminium composite material (ACM) cladding on the external façade of the tower. The architectural crown of the tower (which was installed during the tower's refurbishment for aesthetic purposes only), and the insulation boards and other combustible materials used in the external walls, also contributed, although it was noted that further work was necessary to establish the extent of their contribution.
The report emphasises the courage and devotion to duty shown by individual firefighters but is critical of many aspects of the London Fire Brigade's (LFB) response, including the fact that incident commanders were not trained to recognise or respond to fires in the external walls of high-rise buildings despite the occurrence of similar fires in other countries. A key failing was not revoking the 'stay put' order when the staircase was still passable and more residents could have escaped the burning tower. A further important ground for criticism was the LFB's failure to learn any lessons from the 2009 Lakanal House fire and, indeed, to repeat mistakes made then.
Of particular significance to the construction sector is the report's conclusion that, after the refurbishment, the external walls did not comply with Building Regulations because they did not adequately resist the spread of fire. On the contrary, they actively promoted the spread of fire. Moore-Bick noted that how those responsible for the design and construction of the cladding system, and the work associated with it, satisfied themselves that, on completion of the work, the building would comply with Building Regulations, is a separate question. This will be investigated in Phase 2, as well as whether a prescriptive regime is the most effective way to ensure the safety of those who live and work in high-rise buildings and whether the current guidance on how to comply with Building Regulations is sufficiently clear and reliable.
While Phase 2 will consider the technical failures in greater depth, the report makes recommendations on what can be done immediately to improve the safety of residents of high-rise buildings, including the introduction of new legal obligations on owners and managers.
Removing ACM panels with polyethylene cores from the exterior of high-rise buildings as a matter of urgency is, unsurprisingly, endorsed by Moore-Bick. As he pointed out, this is widely recognised as the right course of action but the speed at which such cladding is being replaced is too slow. However, the report has chosen not to recommend a moratorium on the use of specific materials at this stage beyond the ACM cladding ban already implemented by the government.
Despite the current turmoil in British politics, it is to be hoped that Moore-Bick's findings will be considered by the government in tandem with its current review of last year's Hackitt Report. The government is in the process of analysing the responses to its post-Hackitt consultation – 'Building a Safer Future' - but confirmed, in October's Queen's Speech, its commitment to urgently implementing Hackitt's findings, including appointing a new building safety regulator.
An issue flagged by the Phase 1 report is the definition of high-rise buildings for the purposes of fire safety. In Scotland, new regulations mean that a high-rise building is one that is over 11 metres whereas in England and Wales it remains 18 metres. Moore-Bick has stated that the question of whether the threshold in England and Wales should be lowered will be considered in Phase 2. 'Building a Safer Future' retains the 18 metre trigger height in respect of residential buildings, although in a related consultation on sprinkler provision, the government is seeking views and evidence on whether a lower height would be safer.
The findings of the report will form the springboard for Phase 2 of the Inquiry which will focus on the design of the cladding and choice of materials; the testing and certification of those materials; and, the role of central and local government in promoting fire safety, both in terms of appropriate legislation and guidance, and ensuring the provision of effective fire services. The LFB will also be subject to further scrutiny. In essence, Phase 2 will be more focused on fault and less on events, and so will be of wider impact in terms of identifying necessary regulatory change. Unfortunately, as Phase 2 will not begin until 2020 and may not conclude until 2022, the government is not in a position to wait for the published report. It needs to synthesise the Phase 1 report with its post-Hackitt consultation with the aim of implementing regulatory change much sooner.
