UK Supreme Court Denies Capital Allowances for Survey Costs
In a decision that has attracted considerable interest, the Supreme Court has overruled the Court of Appeal in the case of Ørsted West of Duddon Sands (previously known as Gunfleet Sands).
The Supreme Court has unanimously decided that expenditure on environmental surveys and studies carried out during the planning and design of offshore windfarms is not capital expenditure "on the provision of" plant, overruling the Court of Appeal and concluding that expenditure requires a close connection with the plant itself to qualify for plant and machinery capital allowances.
A striking feature of this dispute has been the level of disagreement at each level of the courts on what appears, on its face, to be a straightforward question of statutory construction. Taxpayers will be disappointed that it has now been determined that such expenditure will not qualify for capital allowances but the decision at least gives greater certainty in respect of expenditure similar to that discussed in this case. However, the decision is highly fact sensitive and other types of pre-construction expenditure, e.g. final technical drawings or surveys carried out during fabrication or installation, will need to be assessed on a case-by-case basis to determine where the boundary lies for qualifying expenditure.
For taxpayers engaged in major infrastructure projects, the immediate priority is to review existing capital allowance claims and prospective positions in light of this decision, and to ensure that future project budgets and financial models reflect the unavailability of allowances on most pre-construction activities.
The Ørsted group owns and operates several offshore windfarms off the English coast. In the course of planning and constructing those windfarms, the group incurred substantial sums on a wide range of pre-construction environmental and technical surveys and studies, most of which were required to support the environmental impact assessment necessary to obtain planning consent
Ørsted claimed capital allowances on these costs (totalling approximately £46m of expenditure), arguing they constituted capital expenditure "on the provision of plant" under section 11(4)(a) of CAA 2001. The parties were agreed that the generation assets of each windfarm were treated as a single item which constituted "plant", and that the expenditure was capital in nature. The sole question was whether the costs were incurred "on" the provision of that plant.
The Court held that the costs of obtaining surveys and studies are not capital expenditure "on" the provision of the windfarms. The word "on" in the legislation connotes a narrow test, requiring a close connection between the expenditure and the plant provided, and contrasts with the looser language Parliament has used elsewhere e.g. "in connection with", "relating to", or "with a view to", none of which appear in section 11(4).
The Court found that the primary qualifying cost is the purchase price of the plant (whether off-the-shelf or bespoke), together with certain specific costs such as transport and installation. Studies and surveys that provide advice about how to choose, design, or locate plant fall "well outside" the boundaries of qualifying expenditure.
Furthermore, there is no principle that all costs necessarily incurred to provide plant qualify for allowances; this was a misreading of the case of Barclay, Curle (concerning dry dock excavation costs) which in fact was decided on the basis that the lined excavated basin was itself an integral part of the plant and not simply necessary preparatory works.
The Supreme Court emphasised that capital allowances are designed to reflect the gradual deterioration of an asset through wear and tear and the ultimate need to replace it. The surveys and studies, the Court held, had only a tangential connection with the diminishing value of the windfarm assets, which further militated against their inclusion. In assessing this question, there seemed to be very little discussion as to whether the surveys and studies would need to be refreshed before replacement plant was installed which might be thought to form an important part of this analysis. If, on replacement of the assets at the end of their useful life, refreshed surveys and studies would need to be obtained, the expenditure incurred on the existing surveys or studies might also need to be depreciated in a similar manner to wear and tear, but it appears that this argument was not raised or considered before the Supreme Court or in their subsequent decision.
This is a significant decision that will affect taxpayers across a range of sectors. The following points should be noted.
The Government's Corporate Tax Roadmap previously promised a consultation on the tax treatment of predevelopment costs, which was delayed following the Court of Appeal's decision in this case. The Supreme Court's decision provides further impetus to the need for the Government to provide clarity - and potentially relief - for expenditure on predevelopment costs that do not currently fall within the statutory wording.
The information provided is not intended to be a comprehensive review of all developments in the law and practice, or to cover all aspects of those referred to.
Readers should take legal advice before applying it to specific issues or transactions.