Legal development

Exploring Disputes in Outer Space – The Final Frontier

A space shuttle launching into space with Earth and a bright sun in the background.

    This article was published in the ICC Dispute Resolution Bulletin (issue 2025-2), also available in the ICC Dispute Resolution Library. Reproduced with permission of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC).

    Myfanwy Wood

    Myfanwy is a Partner in the international arbitration team at Ashurst LLP, London with particular expertise in global energy and resources disputes and experience in technology and financial disputes. She advises in relation to international arbitration, other cross border disputes and public international law. Myfanwy holds a master’s degree in International Law from the University of Cambridge where she was a Davis McCaughey scholar and is listed as a Global Elite Thought Leader in Arbitration in the Lexology Index (formally WhosWhoLegal).

    Aled McNeile

    Aled is an Associate in the international arbitration team at Ashurst LLP, London. His work includes advising on international commercial arbitration, investor state disputes, and disputes arising out of construction projects (including litigation). He is qualified in England and Wales.

    The authors would like to thank Charlotte Cattaneo and Freddie Freeman for their assistance with this article.

    The exploration and utilisation of outer space has significantly advanced over the past few decades, leading to unprecedented opportunities and challenges. As States and private entities increasingly engage in space activities, the potential for disputes has grown, including over the use of space resources and the environmental impacts of space activities. This article examines how the current legal framework addresses these issues, and the adjustments that will be required to keep pace with the future increase in disputes arising from operations in space.

    1. Setting the scene

    The commercial space race has well and truly begun, and outer space – once the exclusive domain of States – is increasingly becoming a playground for private actors. Space has never been more accessible: the cost of launches and satellites has decreased, and constant advances in technology make the possibilities of what can be achieved infinite. One only has to follow the news to see the latest foray into space by a new company or billionaire. As opportunities in space increase, so too does the scope for potential disputes.

    In this article, we explore the legal framework governing disputes in space, the types of disputes we expect to see in the future, and whether the existing legal framework is sufficient to address those disputes. We also consider what steps parties might take to best protect their positions when drafting agreements for their activities in space.

    2. Current legal framework

    The foundations of international space law are contained in a series of five United Nations treaties (“UN Treaties”), which were drafted predominantly with the rights and obligations of States in mind.1 On top of this international framework, there also exists soft law,2 other multilateral agreements, and domestic laws.

    i) United Nations Treaties

    Arguably the most significant and widely ratified treaty (currently ratified by 116 States), is the 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and other Celestial Bodies (the “Outer Space Treaty”).3 With its foundational principles considered customary international law,4 the Outer Space Treaty establishes that outer space is “the province of all mankind”;5 that any space activities must be carried out “in accordance with international law”;6 the principle of non-appropriation in outer space;7 and that States agree to bear “international responsibility” for their “national activities” in space.8 States will also be “internationally liable” for any damage their space activities cause to another State or any “natural or juridical persons” in another State.9

    Notably, however, no provision is made for how disputes are to be resolved, or how a cause of action might be established between, for example, a State and a private entity.

    Also significant is the 1972 Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects (the “Liability Convention”)10 which is ratified by 100 States. The key principles of this Convention form part of customary international law and set out the liability that a “launching State” owes foreign States or their nationals.11 The Convention also establishes strict liability for damage caused by a State’s space objects on Earth12 and “fault” based liability where that damage is caused in outer space.13

    The Liability Convention is, however, far from comprehensive. Despite being the only treaty to make provision for dispute resolution, by way of a Claims Commission, the decisions made by that Commission are not binding unless the parties agree otherwise.14

    Furthermore, the definition of “damage” is limited15 and does not appear to include economic harm. The Convention also offers no definition of “fault”, which presents inevitable difficulties in the international context where certain jurisdictions approach concepts like fault and negligence differently.

    The 1976 Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space (the “Registration Convention”)16 requires “launching States” to register the details of a space object launched into orbit both onto its own register17 and with the United Nations.18

    The 1984 Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (the “Moon Convention”)19 establishes that the Moon (and specifically its natural resources) is the “common heritage of mankind”,20 and not subject to national appropriation.21

    Finally, the 1968 Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space (the “Rescue Agreement”)22 addresses the rescue of astronauts in outer space. It is of limited relevance to this article.

    ii) Multilateral agreements

    The most significant23 multilateral agreements are the 2020 Artemis Accords (the “Accords”) with 56 State signatories including the USA, the UK, Australia and Canada. The Accords establish a set of principles to regulate activities in space and also support NASA’s Artemis programme. The Accords are said to be built on international law, including the Outer Space Treaty, which provides for the principle of non-appropriation.24 Controversially, however, the Accords have taken a very liberal interpretation of that principle and provide that:

    “The extraction of space resources does not inherently constitute national appropriation”.25

    It is important to note, however, that the Accords are “political commitments”26 and not binding on signatory nations or on private actors. They also do not make provision for dispute resolution.

    iii) Domestic legislation

    Several countries have enacted domestic laws and regulations to govern space activities.27 By way of example, the Space Industry Act 2018 and associated Space Industry Regulations in the United Kingdom impose a licensing regime with strict requirements as to safety,28 qualifications, and training29 for those who seek to conduct space activities from the United Kingdom.

    Similar requirements are found in other domestic legislation30 and reflect the growing preference for States to regulate the activities of their space actors to ensure suitable protections (for which the State will ultimately be liable under international law). Similarly, in France the domestic space law regime relating to space operations imposes an obligation to be covered by insurance or have an approved financial guarantee which must cover the risk of having to indemnify any damage caused to third parties.31

    3. What disputes are we currently seeing?

    Currently, space is predominantly being used for telecommunications (primarily via satellites), exploration, energy, science, and tourism. The disputes reported to date reflect this and include contractual disputes concerning, for example, payments due under satellite leasing agreements,32 and claims for delays and defects in respect of satellite delivery agreements.33 We have also seen a handful of claims brought against States by foreign investors seeking protection for their space-related investments under investment treaties.34

    The increase in space launches35 has also seen disputes arising out of damage caused by space debris, including on Earth.36 A notable example saw Canada and the Soviet Union negotiate a Memorandum of Understanding to cover the clean-up costs of a nuclear-powered Soviet satellite which crashed in Canadian territory.37 We also expect further disputes where debris causes damage to other space objects, particularly where the treaties are silent on space debris specifically but impose liability on States where damage is caused by an object which a State launches into outer space.38

    4. What disputes are likely to arise and are we prepared for them?

    In the future, it is not difficult to envisage space being used for many other exploits (e.g. entertainment, the exploitation of natural resources, war, art, medicine – the list is potentially endless). The disputes will no longer be restricted to State vs. State disputes; they will also be State vs. private entities, private entities vs. State, multiple States vs. private entities and vice versa, and private entities vs. private entities. Further, these disputes might not be based on contract or treaty. They could be non-contractual disputes such as tort, criminal liability, regulatory or security breaches, human rights issues and, of course, environmental disputes.

    This article does not address all potential scenarios; however, we discuss below a few of the key issues we envisage may arise within the current legal framework.

    i) Disputes between private entities and States

    An obvious issue with the existing legal framework is the ability of private entities to claim against States in the light of sovereign immunity challenges, and also that the existing international law framework focuses on interstate liability.

    The position private entities therefore find themselves in is similar to the situation faced by foreign investors before the rise of bilateral investment treaties (“BITs”), multilateral investment treaties (“MITs”) and the advent of the ICSID Convention.39

    Commentary on the point has suggested that a potential solution to this gap in the space law regime is either:

    • to shoehorn such disputes into the existing investor-State dispute framework, or
    • to create a framework that is similar to ICSID but that applies to disputes in space, for example a new International Centre for the Settlement of Outer-Space Disputes.40

    There is merit in both of these suggestions. For example, space-related claims have already been brought against States by private actors under the ICSID Convention. These claims have ultimately, however, been in circumstances where the investor already has a connection with the State (e.g. by way of a qualifying “investment” in that territory on Earth) and where the State’s actions have interfered with that investment.41

    A key issue in shoehorning these disputes into the existing ICSID framework more generally is that not all disputes between private parties and States will qualify as “investment disputes” for the purposes of the existing investment treaty framework. To qualify as an investor-State dispute, the dispute must fall within the jurisdictional scope of the treaty or agreement. Disputes in space, however, might fail to meet the threshold for jurisdiction on a number of grounds, including the nationality of the “investor”, the definition of “investment” and, more relevantly to outer space, the territorial jurisdiction of said “investment”. As such, although adjudicating these disputes in the existing investment treaty framework might provide a solution in some cases, it is a far from universal solution for all potential disputes in outer space.

    The proposal to create a new International Centre for the Settlement of Outer-Space Disputes could, in theory, be a workable solution to these challenges. The difficulty, however, is whether States would sign up to another legal regime that would arguably limit their sovereignty. This is particularly so given the recent trend of States becoming increasingly sceptical of investment treaties, evidenced by, for example, the EU, the UK and others breaking away from the Energy Charter Treaty,42 and numerous other treaty terminations and renegotiations globally.43

    In 2023, for the third consecutive year, treaty terminations exceeded new international investment agreements and, between 2013 and 2022, 404 international investment agreements had been terminated.44

    An alternative way in which private parties might be able to raise claims against States within the current framework is by utilising diplomatic avenues through “launching” or “registered” States. The principal UN Treaty addressing liability caused in space is drafted such that States bear ultimate responsibility for damage caused by space objects launched by private parties who use those States as “launching” States,45 and those States therefore risk facing a claim for compensation for damage caused.46 It might therefore be argued that the inverse responsibility ought to apply i.e. if a private actor registered in or launched from State A was damaged by a vehicle belonging to State B, that private party might require the government of State A to seek compensation from State B on its behalf.

    Again, this solution is far from ideal and to provide comfort to the private entities, some robust domestic legal framework would need to be in place. For example, if it is required that the private entity must have adequate insurance cover (presumably, in part, to cover the scenario where they potentially cause some damage making their “launching” or “registered” State liable),47 then there might be a reciprocal arrangement in place whereby the “launching” or “registered” State will pursue damages against the State that is liable for any loss or damage suffered by the private entity. The question is then whether a State would voluntarily enact such a requirement. An incentive, however, might be that enacting such requirements would help attract private actors to base their space operations in the State.

    ii) Environmental impacts of space activities

    Activities in space have the potential to impact Earth, the Earth’s atmosphere, and potentially its climate. This impact could potentially be felt by all of humankind, regardless of classes or groups of humans, and regardless of nationality or any other social or political lines.

    There are a number of potential issues with prosecuting such cases. It could be difficult to establish the elements of fault and/or causation, or even to establish jurisdiction, if the causative action takes place in outer space. These concerns are potentially similar to those we currently see on Earth in respect of environmental disputes. Parallels could, for example, be drawn with the carbon emissions case brought against Shell in the Netherlands, which recognised that producers of carbon intensive fossil fuels are responsible for reducing their emissions in efforts to achieve the goals of the Paris Agreement on climate change,48 or with direct challenges by individuals impacted by climate change against producers of carbon emissions.49 Given the recent ICJ Opinion “Obligations of States in Respect of Climate Change”,50 parties might also choose to base any claim in human rights law.

    A potential answer might lie in class action regimes, but the same issues that are mentioned above in relation to disputes between private parties and States are likely to arise here. If the harm is caused by a State, how would a class of individuals file an action against a State with sovereign immunity? Where that harm is caused by a State, or group of States, the State from which the impacted private party is a national, will need to be willing to take up the cause. 51 It is difficult to envisage a State doing so in situations where there are numerous States impacted or where broader political considerations restrict its appetite to do so.

    iii) Resource utilisation issues

    As the race for precious minerals accelerates on Earth, it is easy to see the race stretch into space. Research has shown that planets, asteroids, and the Moon are rich in various precious metals, minerals, gases, and water,52 and it is only a matter of time before States and private actors seek to exploit these natural resources. Whilst the Outer Space Treaty protects space as “the province of all mankind”,53 including through its principle of non-appropriation,54 the 2020 Artemis Accords (see 2(ii) above) have interpreted this broadly as meaning that the exploitation of minerals and natural resources is not prohibited, whilst also maintaining that signatories cannot claim sovereignty over any celestial body or its resources.

    The scope for disputes is ripe, particularly given the tensions between the Outer Space Treaty and the Accords. What is more, the Accords make provision for its signatories to designate “deconfliction” safety zones to “avoid harmful interference” with their own activities.55 The ambiguity this might present for signatories to attempt to assert control over certain areas56 might present issues with territorial jurisdiction.

    iv) Warfare/criminal concerns

    Unfortunately, it is also likely that war and crime will continue to creep into space activities. Missiles launched from space, or criminal activity or assault taking place in space, do not feel too far from the the realms of possibility, or at least not to these authors. Although there might not be territorial jurisdiction in space, it is likely that States will be able to assume jurisdiction based on the nationality of any victim or even universal jurisdiction for crimes that breach Jus Cogens norms, and therefore any disputes can probably be dealt with using the existing legal infrastructure on Earth.

    v) Rogue actors

    As space becomes more accessible, a situation in which unregistered and unidentifiable private actors begin operating in space is conceivable. Without territorial jurisdiction in space, or an agreed supranational means to “police” space, it will be difficult to apportion fault or liability. It is likely, however, that in such cases States will have universal jurisdiction to prosecute for misconduct on the basis of law of piracy, for example.57

    5. The role of arbitration

    There are a number of the shortcomings with how the current state of international space law addresses potential disputes and, particularly, its limited provision for dispute resolution mechanisms.58 However, private actors and States can try to mitigate their exposure to these challenges by providing for arbitration as a dispute resolution mechanism when contracting with each other, or indeed by agreement after a dispute has arisen.

    As arbitration is consent-based and flexible, it can be adapted to novel scenarios, cross-border disputes and also disputes between States and private entities – making it an attractive option in the context of space disputes. Parties in arbitration can also choose a neutral seat of arbitration and choose their arbitrators. Importantly, arbitration is also confidential (if the parties so choose) and awards can be enforced in the 173 contracting States that have signed the New York Convention.59

    Certain actors and inter-governmental bodies have already recognised this approach, with the European Space Agency60 and Intelsat61 including provision for arbitration in their standard contracts and constitutional documents. Indeed, the conventions which establish a number of intergovernmental organisations operating in space already provide for mandatory or optional arbitration as a method of dispute resolution.62

    Arbitral institutions have also begun to recognise their future role in space disputes. The Permanent Court of Arbitration, for example, has developed the Optional Rules for Arbitration of Disputes Relating to Outer Space Activities (the “Space Rules”)63 which are intended to be industry-specific and provide for an automatic waiver of sovereign or other immunity. Similarly, the Dubai International Financial Centre has recently established its Courts of Space in an attempt to establish itself as a hub to resolve space disputes.64

    As far as we are aware, neither of these have been used but provide useful case studies to watch as the area evolves.

    6. Drafting for the space age: What can parties do to anticipate space disputes at the drafting stage?

    Despite the challenges that may arise when operating in space, there are factors that parties can consider when setting up their legal relationships.

    Parties should be aware of certain risks and may consider the following factors:

    • the apportionment of liability;
    • potential third-party claims or liabilities;
    • insurance obligations;
    • applicable licensing regimes and domestic laws of any potential launching or registering State;
    • registration of space objects; and, more importantly,
    • which law might be most suitable to apply any agreement – in this respect, and unless the circumstances require otherwise, there is probably merit in selecting a governing law with a sophisticated domestic space law legislation.

    Beyond agreeing to arbitrate in the parties’ individual contracts, where the parties envisage performing multiple operations in space together, they might also want to consider whether an umbrella dispute resolution agreement should be put in place to apply to a suite of contracts with the same party/parties or provide for the consolidation of related disputes. Careful drafting would obviously require that the umbrella agreement adequately covers the scope of the parties’ intended operations, but there is clearly merit in parties with longer-term relationships agreeing an overarching mechanism for the resolution of disputes, particularly in circumstances as novel as those anticipated in space. And crucially, if contracting with a State or a State-owned entity, parties should ensure that issues around sovereign immunity are addressed in writing.

    If considering an arbitration clause, parties should also consider carefully the seat of arbitration and also the institutional rules.65 Particularly if contracting with States or State-owned entities, a good seat in an arbitration friendly jurisdiction is recommended.

    7. Concluding remarks

    With the rapid advancement of space related activities and in particular, exploitation and exploration from varied actors including from the private sector, the legal community will have to grapple swiftly with the current legal framework, particularly in relation to dispute resolution, in order to ensure the effective and fair management of space related disputes. For the time being, parties should be alive to the shortcomings of the current regime and seek to mitigate their exposure to the extent they can in their contracts and investment structures.

    Other author: Aled McNeile, Associate


    1. See section 4 for more detail.
    2. See e.g.: The Principles Relevant to the Use of Nuclear Power Sources in Outer Space UNGA Res 47/68 (14 Dec. 1992) UN Doc A/RES/47/68; The Principles Governing the Use of Artificial Earth Satellites for International Direct Television Broadcasting UNGA Res 37/92 (10 Dec. 1982) UN Doc A/RES/37/92; and the Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee, “IADC Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines” (3 Feb. 2025) A/AC.105/C.1/2025/CRP.9.
    3. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and other Celestial Bodies (adopted on 19 Dec. 1966 and entered into force on 10 Oct. 1967) 610 UNTS 205 (Outer Space Treaty).
    4. Articles I and II of the Outer Space Treaty. See e.g. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, “Responses to the set of questions provided by the Chair of the Working Group on the Status and Application of the Five United Nations Treaties on Outer Space” (15 Apr. 2024) A/AC.105/C.2/2024/ CRP.8.
    5. Outer Space Treaty (supra note 3), Art. I.
    6. Ibid, Art. III.
    7. Ibid, Art. II.
    8. Ibid, Art. VI.
    9. Ibid, Art. VII.
    10. Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects (adopted on 29 March 1972 and entered into force on 1 Sep. 1972), 861 UNTS 187 (Liability Convention).
    11. Ibid, Art. II. See also e,g, Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (supra note 4). The scope of a “launching State” is drawn broadly to include both States which launch or “procure” the launching of a space object, and States “from whose territory or facility” a space object is launched (Art. I(c)).
    12. Ibid, Art. II.
    13. Ibid, Art. III.
    14. Ibid, Art. XIX.2. Further details of the shortcomings of the Claims Commission were considered in a previous edition of this bulletin: see R O’Grady, “Dispute Resolution in the Commercial Space Age: Are all Space-Farers Adequately Catered For?” (2021) 3 ICC Dispute Resolution Bulletin 54.
    15. Ibid, Art. I(a). The definition covers “loss of life, personal injury or other impairment of health; or loss of or damage to property of States or of persons, natural or juridical, or property of international intergovernmental organizations”.
    16. Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space (adopted on 14 Jan. 1975 and entered into force on 15 Sep. 1976), 1023 UNTS 15 (Registration Convention).
    17. Ibid, Art. II. The same broad definition of “launching State” is applied as in the Liability Convention, but notably no dispute resolution mechanism exists to decide where registration should ultimately lie when a number of launching States fall within scope (e.g. where an object was manufactured in one State, owned by a company incorporated in another, and eventually launched by a further State). See e.g. J.W. Nelson, “Lost in Space? Gaps in the  International Space Object Registration Regime” (EJIL Talk, 19 Nov. 2018).
    18. Registration Convention (supra note 16), Art. IV.
    19. Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (adopted on 18 Dec. 1979 and entered into force on 11 July 1984), 1363 UNTS 22 (“Moon Convention”), with the fewest ratifications of just 18 State parties – fewer than the signatories to the Artemis Accords: see e.g. S. M. Wedenig, J.W. Nelson, “The Moon Agreement: Hanging by a Thread?”, McGill SGI Research Papers in Business, Finance, Law and Society, Research Paper No. 2023-19.
    20. Moon Convention, Art. 11(1). It also requires all activities on the Moon (including its exploration and use) to be carried out “in accordance with international law” (Art. 2).
    21. Ibid, Art. 11(2). Neither the surface nor the subsurface nor any part of its natural resources shall become property of any State, intergovernmental organisation, or non-governmental organisation (Art. 11(3)).
    22. Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space (adopted on 22 Apr. 1968 and entered into force on 3 Dec. 1968), 672 UNTS 119.
    23. Other examples of multilateral agreements include, for example, the International Space Station Intergovernmental Agreement (adopted on 29 Jan. 1998 and entered into force on 27 Mar. 2001) TIAS 12927 (and signed by Canada, the USA, ESA, Japan, and Russia), and the Convention on the Establishment of a European Space Agency (adopted on 30 May 1975 and entered into force on 30 Oct. 1980) 1297 UNTS 161 (ESA Convention).
    24. Outer Space Treaty (supra note 3), Art. II.
    25. The Artemis Accords: Principles for Cooperation in the Civil Exploration and Use of the Moon, Mars, Comets, and Asteroids for Peaceful Purposes (signed 13 Oct. 2020) (“Artemis Accords”), s 10(2).
    26. Ibid, s 1.
    27. See e.g. the Basic Space Law 2008 (Law No. 43 of 2008) in Japan, and the Space (Launches and Returns) Act 2018 and Space Activities Regulations 2001 (Statutory Rules 2001 No 186) in Australia.
    28. Space Industry Regulations 2021, SI 2021/792, in particular Part 8. See also A. Simmonds, “The Space Industry regulations 2021: Another Giant Leap?” (2021) 26(2) Coventry Law Journal 69-89.
    29. Ibid, Part 7.
    30. See e.g. in Luxembourg, Loi du 15 déc. 2020 portant sur les activités spatiales.
    31. Loi n° 2008-518 du 3 juin 2008 relative aux opérations spatiales, Art. 6.
    32. Avanti Communications Group PLC v. Ministry of Defence of the Government of Indonesia (LCIA) Details of the award are not published but its existence has been confirmed by the parties› counsel: see Jones Day, Avanti Communications recovers more than $20 million award against Indonesian MoD (Jones Day, July 2018).
    33. Insurers of Thuraya Satellite Telecommunications v. Boeing Satellite Systems International, Inc. (2009). Details of the award are not published but its existence has been confirmed by Boeing’s tax filings, see Troutman Pepper Locke, Boeing prevails in satellite arbitration (Lexology, 17 Feb. 2009).
    34. See section 4(i) below.
    35. UNOOSA data shows that as many as 2,849 objects were launched into space in 2024 alone, compared with just 241 a decade earlier: UNOOSA, Annual number of objects launched into space (Our World in Data, 2025).
    36. See e.g. N. May, SpaceX capsule confirmed as source of space debris that crashed on farm in Australia (The Guardian, 4 Aug. 2022); M.A. Garcia, NASA Completes Analysis of Recovered Space Object (NASA, 15 April 2024).
    37. Disintegration of COSMOS 954 over Canadian territory in 1978: Protocol between the Government of Canada and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (signed 2 April 1981).
    38. Space Treaty (supra note 3), Art. VI; Liability Convention (supra note 10), Art. III.
    39. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (adopted 18 March 1965 and entered into force 14 Oct. 1966), 575 UNTS 159.
    40. R. O’Grady, “Star wars: the launch of extranational arbitration?” (2016) 82(4) CIARb Arbitration Journal, 380-390.
    41. For example, in Eutelsat S.A. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/17/2, the claim was brought under the Mexico-France BIT and related to a decision by the Mexican government to require a Mexican satellite company to reserve capacity for use by the Mexican government.
    42. Council of the EU, Energy Charter Treaty: Council gives final green light to EU’s withdrawal (Council of the EU, Press release, 30 May 2024); International Energy Charter, Written notification of withdrawal from the Energy Charter Treaty (28 May 2024).
    43. For example, India alone has terminated 77 ratified BITs since 2016: see Investment Treaty Arbitration: India (GAR, 26 Aug. 2025). See also infra note 44.
    44. UNCTAD, Trends in the Investment Treaty Regime and a Reform Toolbox for the Energy Transition (Investment Policy Hub, 2023).
    45. Liability Convention (supra note 10) imposes absolute liability on a state for damage caused by its objects on Earth (Art. II), and “fault”-based liability where that damage is caused in space (Art. III).
    46. Ibid, Art. VIII.
    47. As it is, for example, in France (supra note 31).
    48. Shell plc v. Vereniging Milieudefensie, case number 200.302.332/01 Gerechtshof Den Haag.
    49. See e.g. Luciano Lliuya v. RWE AG case number 5 U 15/17 OLG Hamm.
    50. Obligations of States in Respect of Climate Change (Advisory Opinion, 2025), at para. 403.
    51. Although the Liability Convention envisages that harm might be caused to a State’s “natural or juridical person”, ultimate responsibility for any such harm caused rests with the launching State: see Liability Convention (supra note 10) Arts. II and III.
    52. See e.g. Luxembourg Space Agency, Resources in Space (2025).
    53. Outer Space Treaty (supra note 3), Art. I.
    54. Ibid, Art. II.
    55. Artemis Accords, s 11(7).
    56. See e.g. J.W. Nelson, “Safety Zones: A Near-Term Legal Issue on the Moon” (2020) 44(2) Journal of Space Law 604.
    57. Convention on the Law of the Sea (adopted on 10 Dec. 1982 and entered into force on 16 Nov 1994), 1833 UNTS 387, Art. 100.
    58. See in particular R. O’Grady (2016) (supra note 40).
    59. See status as at 9 Sep. 2025 (https://treaties.un.org). See also O’Grady (2021, supra note 14).
    60. See General Clauses and Conditions for ESA Contracts, ESA/REG/002, Rev. 3, Art. 35.2.
    61. Agreement relating to the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization (adopted on 20 Aug. 1971 and entered into force on 12 Feb. 1973), 1220 UNTS 21, Art. XVIII (INTELSAT); Operating Agreement relating to the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization (adopted on 20 Aug. 1971 and entered into force on 12 Feb. 1973), 1220 UNTS 149, Art. 20.
    62. See e.g. the INTELSAT and ESA Convention (supra notes 60, 61); see also generally R. O’Grady (2016, supra note 40); and R. O’Grady (2021, supra note 14) at 56-57.
    63. Permanent Court of Arbitration, Optional Rules for Arbitration of Disputes Relating to Outer Space Activities (6 Dec. 2011) (“PCA Space Rules”).
    64. See DIFC Courts, Space Disputes Guide (2nd ed., Feb 2023)
    65. Parties might also consider the PCA Space Rules (supra note 63) to govern the dispute, if appropriate.

    The information provided is not intended to be a comprehensive review of all developments in the law and practice, or to cover all aspects of those referred to.
    Readers should take legal advice before applying it to specific issues or transactions.