Do your lawyers know who they are acting for? Court finds lawyer was jointly retained to represent parties in a commercial transaction
The Plaintiff and Defendant agreed to establish a private equity fund using a "venture capital limited partnership" structure. A law firm was engaged to advise on the establishment of the fund and prepare the fund's constituent documents. Following establishment, a dispute arose about control of the fund. In the ensuing litigation, the Federal Court ordered (among other things) that the Plaintiff transfer her "partnership interest" to the Defendant at a price to be determined by the Court.
The Defendant (and his co-defendant company) issued a subpoena to the law firm for production of its legal file for the fund's establishment. The law firm and a company controlled by the Plaintiff resisted production on the basis that the legal file was subject to a claim of legal professional privilege by the company. The Plaintiff's company claimed that it had solely engaged the law firm to represent its interests in relation to the fund.
The Defendant argued that he had engaged the law firm – either solely, or jointly with the Plaintiff's company – and, accordingly, the Plaintiff's company could not maintain a claim of legal professional privilege against him. The Plaintiff's company argued the Defendant had only been involved in communications with the law firm for transparency because he was the "cornerstone investor", but that he was never the law firm's client.
Accordingly, the question for the Court was whether the Defendant had engaged the law firm and, if so, whether he had done so jointly with the Plaintiff's company.
The Court observed the existence of a retainer – including an implied retainer – is determined by inference from objective facts, not by the lawyer's belief as to which clients he or she was acting for. It cited with approval the statement in Dal Pont’s Lawyers’ Professional Responsibility (cited in Watson v Ebsworth & Ebsworth (a firm) (2010) 31 VR 123 and Salmon v Albarran (2023) 414 ALR 36) that "[p]roof of an implied retainer rests on proof of facts and circumstances sufficient to establish a tacit agreement to provide legal services. Its existence is determined by inference from objective facts, not merely by the lawyer’s belief as to which clients he or she was acting for."
The Court also relied on observations in Pegrum v Fatharly (1996) 14 WAR 92 that where both parties to a transaction consult the same solicitor and together provide the information needed to prepare the relevant documents, and the solicitor accepts the responsibility without any indication that they cannot fully discharge their professional duties to both, there is a strong bias towards finding that the solicitor tacitly agrees to act for both parties.
The Plaintiff and the lawyer acting at the law firm gave evidence in support of the company's privilege claim. The Plaintiff's evidence included that she called the lawyer to seek to engage the law firm on behalf of her company, and the Defendant was included on communications as a matter of transparency because he was the cornerstone investor. The lawyer's evidence included that he considered the Plaintiff's company was his client, and that he included the Defendant in some communications because the Plaintiff had requested this as the Defendant was to be the cornerstone investor.
In contrast, the Defendant relied solely on contemporaneous written communications between the parties relating to the transaction. The Defendant did not give evidence of his understanding of the retainer.
The Court undertook a detailed review of the contemporaneous communications and found they showed the recollection or understanding of the Plaintiff and the lawyer could not be regarded as objectively correct. The Court found these communications showed that the Plaintiff and Defendant had jointly selected the law firm, jointly agreed to the retainer, jointly discussed payment of legal fees, and jointly provided instructions to the responsible lawyer throughout the establishment of the fund. The lawyer communicated with and provided advice to both of them.
Importantly, the Court found that contemporaneous written communication had to be "regarded as providing a more reliable guide to events than the high-level recollections of witnesses some years later". Instructively, neither the lawyer's own identification of the Plaintiff's company on his file, nor the sworn evidence of both the lawyer and the Plaintiff, was sufficient to displace the inferences drawn by the Court from the documentary evidence.
The Plaintiff's company argued that the absence of affidavit evidence from the Defendant was fatal to any claim that the Defendant held joint privilege in the document.
The Court rejected this argument for several reasons.
First, as noted above, the Defendant could prove there was a joint retainer by objective evidence. The existence of a retainer did not depend on the subjective purpose for which those communications were made.
Second, the Plaintiff gave evidence that the communications with the law firm were made for the dominant purpose of obtaining legal advice. The Court was satisfied, based on the Plaintiff's evidence and the documents themselves, that they were made for the dominant purpose of both clients obtaining legal advice. It was not necessary for the Defendant to also give testimonial evidence that his purpose was to obtain legal advice.
In other words, once the Defendant established that he was a joint client of the law firm, it followed that the privileged communications with the law firm were held jointly by the Plaintiff's company and the Defendant.
The case has several important lessons for clients who want their lawyers to deal with stakeholders beyond their immediate client.
Where multiple parties are involved in a transaction and consult the same lawyer, there is a real risk that a joint retainer could be implied from the circumstances – even if the lawyer does not intend or appreciate this.
If a lawyer does not intend to act for a particular person, the authorities indicate the lawyer should actively take steps to dissuade that person from a belief that the lawyer acts for them. It is worth recalling the general contractual principle that the uncommunicated subjective intentions of one party are generally not relevant in establishing the existence or terms of a contract.
If a lawyer acts for multiple clients in relation to the same or related matters (or is found to have been doing so), the joint clients will not be able to claim privilege against each other in relation to the engagement. This can have important consequences if, for example, there is subsequently a dispute between the joint clients relating to the matter.
Where a lawyer acts for multiple clients on the same or related matters and receives confidential information of one client that is material to the interests of another client, the lawyer must not continue to act unless:
See Australian Solicitors' Conduct Rules, rule 11.4.
Accordingly, your lawyer may need to share your confidential information with any other client for whom they act in the same or a related matter. Alternatively, your lawyer may need to cease acting for the other client.
Other authors: Elizabeth Hewish, Graduate
The information provided is not intended to be a comprehensive review of all developments in the law and practice, or to cover all aspects of those referred to.
Readers should take legal advice before applying it to specific issues or transactions.