Informal workouts
Introduction
Informal workout agreements can renegotiate, delay, reduce or waive pre-existing debts owed by a company. For the debtor company, the main purpose of entering into an informal workout is to obtain agreements from its creditors to relinquish rights and refrain from enforcing certain debt covenants. The following are some commonly used informal workout mechanisms:
- refinancing of debt obligations;
- debt-for-equity swaps;
- discounted debt sales;
- enterprise restructurings;
- exchange offerings; and
- debt write-offs.
To be successful, an informal workout generally requires the consent of all affected creditors. Informal workouts lack the ability to bind dissenting creditors – any creditor who declines to participate in the informal workout can still enforce its legal rights against the company.
An informal workout does not generally carry the stigma of formal insolvency procedures. Additionally, the publicity involved with formal insolvencies can be destructive of the value of a company's goodwill and its standing in the market, thus aggravating the company's financial difficulties.
These considerations have formed part of the argument for a legislative regime in Australia which supports initiatives to restructure companies otherwise than by way of formal procedures.
A barrier to such initiatives is a provision of Australia's Corporations Act (CA), which imposes a duty on directors to prevent insolvent trading.1 In essence, where:
(a) a company incurs a debt;
(b) it is insolvent;
(c) there are grounds to suspect its insolvency; and
(d) the company goes into liquidation,
a director can be liable to compensate the company for the loss it has suffered as a result of the debt being incurred.
Fear of falling foul of insolvent trading prohibitions can be a major deterrent to a company director and a key reason for unwillingness to take any risks around insolvency. Holding companies can also be liable for the losses incurred by their subsidiaries as a result of holding the company incurring debts while insolvent.2
The response to this argument has been the adoption of a "safe harbour". This can operate as a defence to an insolvent trading claim, and is available for both the directors of a company and, where relevant, its holding company.3
Essentially, actions taken by a director whose company may otherwise fall into insolvent trading, may be permissible under safe harbour. This can allow directors to take actions – in particular, incurring further debt – which may ultimately save the company, but with less personal risk to themselves.
Safe-harbour defence
The defence of safe harbour is available where:
(a) a director starts to suspect that the company may become or be insolvent;
(b) the director starts to develop one or more courses of action;
(c) such actions are reasonably likely to lead to a better outcome for the company; and
(d) the debt is incurred directly or indirectly in connection with one of those courses of action.
Safe-harbour or rocky passage?
The safe-harbour defence is relevant only in the context of an insolvent trading claim.
It may not be relied upon as a defence to a claim that directors have breached their statutory duty of care and diligence, although the business judgement rule may be available in the event of such a claim.14
Equally, it would not be a defence to a claim that the directors had failed to discharge their general law duty to take account of the interests of the company's creditors when exercising their powers if the company is insolvent or near insolvent. In this case, an issue to consider would be whether the restructuring plan provides for the payment of "new creditors" to whom debts are incurred in the course of the plan’s implementation. It remains an open question whether directors might be liable, and on what basis, in respect of any unsatisfied claims of those creditors.
In the case of a public listed company, another issue is the company's continuous disclosure obligations. This requires the company to notify the market of information:
(a) that is not generally available; and
(b) which would have a material effect on its share price if it were available.15
The question for directors is whether the state of the company's finances and the development of a restructuring plan would be required to be disclosed to the market consistently with that obligation. If it were, the benefit of discretion, being one of the attractions of an informal workout, would be lost. However, the reality is that large company restructures are undertaken with the support of their financiers who commit to ensuring that the claims of creditors are satisfied. Accordingly, the risks that might otherwise attend the disclosure of the company’s financial position and the proposed development of a restructuring plan may be adequately mitigated.
In Guidance Note 8 to the ASX Listing Rules, it is recognised that “the requirement to disclose materially negative market sensitive information immediately can be an impediment to completing a financial restructure or reorganisation necessary for its survival. However, the proper course for the entity in such a situation is not to disregard its continuous disclosure obligations but instead to approach ASX to discuss the possibility of a trading halt or, if the situation is unlikely to resolve itself within two trading days, a voluntary suspension” (para 5.10).
Further reading
REVIEW OF THE INSOLVENT TRADING SAFE HARBOUR REPORT OF NOVEMBER 2021 |
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In November 2021, the Treasury published its Review of the Insolvent Trading Safe Harbour Report, which outlines, among other things, the following uncontroversial proposed amendments to the Safe-Harbour regime: (a) “The Panel recommends that section 588GA(1)(a) be amended to include a reference to a person starting to suspect the company is in financial distress (in addition, and as an alternative to, a person starting to suspect that the company may become or be insolvent).” (b) “The Panel recommends that the safe harbour protections extend to the obligations of directors under section 596AC, and that section 588GA be amended to refer to subsections 596AC(1) and (3).” (c) “The Panel recommends that the safe harbour protections extend to the obligations of directors under section 596AC, and that section 588GA be amended to refer to subsections 596AC(1) and (3).” (d) "The Panel recommends section 588GB be amended, to clarify that: •if books and records are in a director’s possession and control (even if they are not the books and records ‘of the company’), and •those books and records are not provided to the administrator or liquidator at the time of a formal appointment, •then the director will also be prevented from producing those books and records to establish safe harbour in any relevant proceeding.” (e) “The Panel recommends either the reference to the term ‘restructuring’ in section 588GA(2) be replaced or the definition of restructuring in section 9 be updated to include a definition of that term for the purpose of section 588GA(2)(e).” (f) “The Panel recommends that section 588GA(2)(d) be amended by replacing the reference to ‘an appropriately qualified entity’ with ‘one or more appropriately qualified advisers’.” (g) “The Panel recommends amending subsections 588GA(4)(a) and 588GA(4)(a)(i) to align the wording of those provisions with the wording of the employee entitlement safeguard in Regulation 5.3B.24.” (h) “The Panel recommends that a finite list of tax reporting obligations be included in subsection 588GA(4)(a)(ii).” (i) “The Panel recommends the deletion of subsection 588GA(4)(b)(ii).” (j) “The Panel recommends that a definition of substantial compliance be included in the Act, to assist stakeholders to interpret the requirements of subsection 588GA(4).” The full report by the Treasury can be found here. |
TMA BEST PRACTICE GUIDELINES |
The Turnaround Management Association of Australia (TMA) has issued best practice guidelines entitled Navigate your way to a Safe Habour. These guidelines concisely set out the best approach for directors who suspect insolvency so as to ensure compliance with the Safe Harbour provisions under the Corporations Act. The TMA Best Practice Guidelines can be found here. |
ASIAN BANKERS ASSOCIATION: MODEL AGREEMENT TO PROMOTE COMPANY RESTRUCTURING |
In the early 2000s, Ashurst, together with the Asian Development Bank and the Asian Bankers Association, prepared a model agreement to promote company restructuring (Model Agreement). The Model Agreement was designed to operate cross-border in relation to an industry-wide collaborative scheme to facilitate workouts in Asia. The Model Agreement is, in essence, particularly useful as a template for a standstill agreement, from which it originates. A copy of the Model Agreement (as last updated on 12 September 2013) can be accessed here. The below is a useful guide to the best practice on approaching an informal workout under the Model Agreement for a debtor with multiple financiers. |
The table below is a useful guide to best practice on approaching an informal workout under the Model Agreement for a debtor with multiple financiers.
Footnotes |
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1. Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 588G
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Guide to Restructuring in Australia – Chapter Overview
- Ipso facto
- Voluntary administration
- Receivership
- Schemes of arrangement
- Liquidation
- Tax
- Comparative table of Australian restructuring and insolvency processes
- Comparative table of Australian and international liquidation processes
- Comparative table of Australian and international rehabilitation processes (Download)
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